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Abstract
During the last years, large-scale simulations of realistic
physical environments which support the interaction of
multiple participants over the Internet have become in-
creasingly available and economically significant, most
notably in the computer gaming industry. Such sys-
tems, commonly called networked virtual environments
(NVES), are usually based on a client-server architecture
where for performance reasons and bandwidth restric-
tions, the simulation is partially deferred to the clients.
This inevitable architectural choice renders the simulation
vulnerable to attacks against the semantic integrity of the
simulation: malicious clients may attempt to compromise
the physical and logical laws governing the simulation, or
to alter the causality of events a posteriori.
In this paper, we initiate the systematic study of seman-
tic integrity in NVES from a security point of view. We
argue that naive policies to enforce semantic integrity in-
volve intolerable network load, and are therefore not prac-
tically feasible. We present a new semantic integrity pro-
tocol based on cryptographic primitives which enables the
server system to audit the local computations of the clients
on demand. Our approach facilitates low network and
CPU load, incurs reasonable engineering overhead, and
maximally decouples the auditing process from the soft
∗The work described in this paper has been supported in part by the
European Commission through the IST Programme under Contract IST-
2002-507932 ECRYPT.
real time constraints of the simulation.
1 Introduction
Interactive physically plausible simulations of artificial
worlds have evolved from a topic of philosophical spec-
ulation and science fiction into an increasingly impor-
tant and highly active area of computer science. With
the cheap availability of extensive computing power as
well as networking bandwidth, today’s technology has in
fact surprisingly quickly reached the point of actually im-
plementing networked virtual environments [20, 17] with
reasonable quality. One of the major driving forces in
this development has been the computer gaming indus-
try which has successfully developed massively multi-
player online games (MMORGS) where thousands of hu-
man participants interact over the Internet in artificial en-
vironments with almost photo-realistic simulation qual-
ity [2, 1]. Gaming applications are the ideal playground
for advancing NVE technology: MMORG failure sce-
narios are relatively uncritical (in comparison to, say mili-
tary simulations), technical features are at times more val-
ued by the customers than total reliability, and, last not
least, there are large economic interests from major in-
dustrial players including Microsoft, IBM and Sony.
The long term impact of NVE technology, however,
will be a paradigm switch whose impact reaches far
beyond computer gaming: it is widely expected that
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advanced Internet services facilitating online collabora-
tion, e-commerce, virtual communities, entertainment,
medicine, design, etc. will be based on NVE technology.
Recent special issues by the IEEE Communications Mag-
azine [5] on NVE technology as well as Communications
of the ACM [3, 4] (on the transition of gaming technol-
ogy into canonical computer science, and on interactive
immersion in 3D graphics) reflect the rapidly increasing
industrial interest in NVES.
Despite the evident industrial interest in NVE technol-
ogy, academic contributions to this emerging field hitherto
have been mostly confined to the virtual reality commu-
nity. The technical issues arising in NVES however pose
important challenges to the state of the art in many clas-
sical areas of computer science, including software en-
gineering, distributed systems, databases, and also com-
puter security. The goal of the current paper is to initiate
the systematic study of security issues in NVES and to
present security protocols which prevent malicious par-
ticipants from compromising the semantic integrity of the
NVE.
In order to put our technical results in perspective, we
will first review the architecture of NVEs.
NVE Architecture. Following [20], a virtual environ-
ment is an interactive, immersive, multi-sensory, 3 dimen-
sional, synthetic environment. Typically, the participants
of a virtual environment are represented by avatars (i.e.,
virtual characters) that can move through a realistic vir-
tual world inhabited by various computer-controlled ac-
tive objects. When the virtual environment is distributed
over a number of hosts, we speak of a networked virtual
environment (NVE). We can naturally distinguish two
crucial purposes of networking in NVEs:
• Clustering: Since the computational load of a large-
scale virtual environment is enormous, the simula-
tion needs to be distributed over a number of com-
puters. To this aim, a relatively small number of
nodes is interconnected within an enclosed cluster.
To the outside world, such a cluster ideally mimics
the behavior of a single machine (which we shall call
StateServer later on.) Since all resources within the
cluster are solely dedicated to the NVE, we will as-
sume that they are mutually trusted. Consequently,
clustering does not directly affect the security of the
NVE.
• Remote Access: Networking is an obvious necessity
as soon as a number of geographically dispersed per-
sons or client computers have to interact within the
same virtual environment. In this case however, nei-
ther the connection to the server system nor the client
itself are under control of the NVE system. Conse-
quently, NVES with remote access not only have to
cope with the deficits of the underlying networking
infrastructure (long transmission times and frequent
packet loss, see [18] for an overview), but also with
malicious clients attacking the NVE .
There are two principal architectures to enable remote
access, namely peer-to-peer and client-server. In this pa-
per we are only concerned with remote access NVES
which are based on the more important client-server
model [12]. In a client-server NVE architecture, the au-
thoritative and central version of the state of the NVE
is maintained by the server system StateServer. The
clients Client1, . . . ,Clientn have private and limited ac-
cess to the central state of the NVE.
Each time Clienti wants to update the shared state
of the NVE, it has to send a corresponding request to
StateServer. StateServer checks whether the requested
actions are compliant to the rules of the NVE. If this is
the case, StateServer sends to Clienti an authoritative
state update message that contains (as acknowledgement)
the requested state update of Clienti as well as all changes
to the central state that occurred since the last update mes-
sage was sent to Clienti. Finally, Clienti updates its local
state according to the answer received from the server sys-
tem.
By a client cycle we shall understand one complete
turnaround of the client state as described above, i.e., the
compound procedure which starts with the computation
of the update request by Clienti and ends with the client
state update according to the server response.
Security and Semantic Integrity. In NVES facilitating
remote access, a large number of potentially anonymous
participants interact with the server using client software
which can be modified by malicious participants. Conse-
quently, any security assessment of NVES must assume
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that all clients are untrusted. In Section 2, we provide a
systematic taxonomy of attacks against NVES. We ar-
gue that in addition to the classical security issues of net-
worked systems, NVES can be affected by attacks against
their semantic integrity: A malicious client may attempt
to compromise the physical and logical laws governing
the simulation, or to alter the causality of events a pos-
teriori. Such attacks have been repeatedly reported for
MMORG game applications, yet are rarely found in the
academic literature. Semantic attacks evidently repre-
sent enormous risks for the commercial NVE applications
mentioned above.
Instead of implementing the centralized simulation
model outlined previously, NVES typically employ a dis-
tributed simulation model where the server only maintains
a simplified (“abstract”) global state, whereas the detailed
simulation (e.g., graphical rendering, or extrapolation of
events) is partially deferred to the clients. Such an ap-
proach reduces the processing power requirements for up-
dating the state maintained at the server and reduces the
bandwidth necessary to exchange state updates. However,
the semantic gap between the server and the clients can
be exploited by malicious clients. Such a client can suc-
cessfully submit spurious updates, i.e., updates that are
consistent with the rules of the NVE on the abstract level,
but violate the NVE semantics on the concrete level.
For example, in many entertainment NVES, the server
system is only maintaining rough geometric representa-
tions of physical objects in the simulated world. Conse-
quently, the server-side collision detection is much more
efficient but is also more permissive, while the clients are
responsible for implementing the collision detection at a
detailed level. A malicious client can exploit this situa-
tion by moving an object along a path that is correct with
respect to the rough abstract state but is incorrect with
respect to the concrete state. Figure 1 illustrates this sit-
uation with a simple example where an object has to be
moved through a tunnel: Since the server system main-
tains an abstracted geometrically simple view of the world
(where the boundaries in this case are obtained from con-
vex hulls of certain anchor points), the client is able to
claim that the object can actually be moved through the
tunnel. Since the inconsistent update will be accepted by
the server, the malicious client has successfully broken
the rules of the NVE.
Although the given geometric example may appear
Figure 1: Example of a semantic attack.
simplistic, every reasonably powerful abstraction will in-
evitably result in information loss, enabling malicious
clients to submit spurious updates.
Engineering requirements. Performance and scalabil-
ity constraints require large-scale NVES to employ an ar-
chitecture where significant computations are performed
at the client side; see [17] for a comprehensive overview.
More specifically, any NVE implementation should sat-
isfy the following two requirements:
• Autonomous Clients: The client of an NVE must
be autonomous to provide a fluent simulation. In
particular, the client has to extrapolate missing in-
formation and to interpolate between discrete client
cycles. For example, the client is responsible for ex-
trapolating the current position of an object if a posi-
tion update is lost due to the deficits of the network
connection.
• Abstracted Central State: As argued above,
StateServer can only maintain the abstracted infor-
mation which is necessary to coordinate the clients,
while the clients utilize a more concrete version of
the state. In general, the state server has a more “ab-
stract” view of the world than the clients.
A useful security solution for NVES must be designed to
meet the following requirements in addition:
• Minimal and Scalable Resource Overhead: The
overhead caused by the security solution should be
as small as possible and scale well with respect to the
number of participants and the level of security to be
enforced. While this sounds like an obvious require-
ment, we want to stress that NVES produce heavy
CPU and network loads. Therefore, any approach
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which causes significant CPU or network overhead
at the client- or sever-side is impractical.
• Minimal Quality of Service Requirements. A se-
curity solution should utilize unreliable network ser-
vices for as many messages as possible. Only a few
important messages should require timely and reli-
able send operations.
• Minimal Engineering Overhead: NVES are com-
plex software systems which usually consist of mul-
tiple large software packages. Thus, it is often infea-
sible to modify an existing NVE to meet strict se-
curity requirements. Because of the growing legacy
code which is used to build new NVES, a security
solution should be as independent as possible from
the simulation and should only affect small portions
of the code.
Technical contribution. The main technical contribu-
tion of this paper is a set of protocols which allow to main-
tain the states of the clients and the server consistently
and securely, even in the presence of maliciously modi-
fied clients. The approach is based on an efficient audit
procedure that is performed repeatedly and randomly on
the NVE clients. During the audit process, it is verified
whether the concrete state updates performed by the client
in a specific time frame are valid according to the NVE
semantics. The solution meets all above stated require-
ments:
• The protocols enforce semantic integrity on the
NVE clients, while allowing a central abstracted
state and autonomous clients.
• The solution incurs very low additional network traf-
fic, and requires the transmission of complete client
states over the network only during the audit process.
More precisely, our solution requires only a few ad-
ditional bytes per client cycle which is a negligible
quantity in comparison to the other messages in the
client cycle. The security overhead consists solely
of a Messages Authentication Code which is consid-
ered secure at a size of 16 bytes. On the other hand, a
modern MMORG requires roughly one kilobyte per
client and cycle. Note that with thousands of clients,
bandwidth is a bottleneck mainly at the server side.
• Our solution uses reliable and time critical network
transmissions only for a few small messages. All
other messages, in particular the complete audit pro-
cess, can be implemented solely using unreliable
send operations.
• The audit process is completely independent of the
(time critical) simulation, and will in general not af-
fect the smoothness of the simulation for all but pos-
sibly the audited party.
• The protocol is designed as to be integrated into ex-
isting middleware and clients with tolerable over-
head.
Related Work on Security. Audit trails were success-
fully applied in electronic commerce applications (e.g.,
see [13]). An audit trail enables a special party, called au-
ditor, to verify the correctness of previous transactions.
The audit trail can either be stored at the client or the
server. In any case, the audit information must be pro-
tected from modifications. Bellare and Yee [8] identi-
fied forward security as the key security property for au-
dit trails: even if an attacker completely compromises the
auditing system, he should not be able to forge audit in-
formation referring to the past. Implementations of secure
audit and logging facilities can be found in [16, 15, 9].
The protocols described in this paper follow the prin-
ciples of audit trails, but account for the specific partic-
ularities of NVE environments. Most importantly, our
solution incurs a minimal network traffic overhead, while
retaining its security. In fact, a direct adoption of classical
audit trails to the NVE scenario would inflict a large load
on the network, as the concrete state updates of all clients
must be verified. In our solution, the audit information
is stored at the client side and sent to the auditor on re-
quest. The client only “commits” itself to a status update
by sending a short message to the server, which cannot be
altered later.
Only a few papers have dealt directly with security in
online games. Baughman and Levine [7] concentrated on
peer to peer multiplayer games, while we consider client
server architectures of large-scale online games. Yan and
Choi [21, 22] gave a taxonomy of security issues in on-
line games and a case study on security of online bridge
gaming. Davis [11] points out the importance of security
in online games from a business perspective.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2 we provide a systematic threat analysis for NVES,
whereas Section 3 provides a description of the basic state
update mechanism performed by traditional NVES which
maintain a central abstracted state. Section 4 provides a
detailed technical description of our proposed security so-
lution. Finally, a summary and outlook on future research
can be found in Section 5.
2 Threat Analysis
In the first NVES to be deployed, the users belonged
to well-defined groups whose NVE-clients were trusted.
However, as large-scale NVES with untrusted and dis-
persed participants are becoming more popular, the se-
curity of NVES becomes an eminent issue. The security
threats occurring in the context of an NVE with untrusted
participants can be classified as follows:
1. System Security Attacks: There are a number of
classical security problems associated with NVES,
such as authentication, payment, or host security.
These security issues have been widely studied [6,
19].
2. Semantic Subversion: The participants of an NVE
can interact in the virtual environment according to
a set of rules. The enforcement of these rules is of
crucial importance for all honest participants. We
call attacks targeted at circumventing or subverting
these rules semantic attacks.
(a) Semantic Integrity Violation: Attacks in this
category attempt to violate the physical and
logical laws of the NVE without detection by
the server. All attacks in this class involve ma-
liciously modified software on the client side
and come in two flavors:
i. Rule Corruption: The malicious client
attempts to modify the simulation in a way
that is illegal but plausible to the server
system.
ii. Causality Alteration: The malicious
client attempts to withdraw previous ac-
tions to obtain unfair advantages, i.e., the
client attempts to “rewrite its history”.
(b) Client Amplification: In this case, the client
employs special software to achieve capabil-
ities to exploit the possibilities of the NVE
in an unintended manner. During such an at-
tack, the externally observable behavior of the
amplified client is not reliably distinguishable
from the behavior of a honest client. Amplifi-
cation attacks contain the following two main
categories:
i. Sniffing: The malicious client exposes in-
formation which has to be downloaded for
technical reasons but is not intended to be
observable immediately.
ii. Agents: The malicious client enhances the
natural capabilities of the human partici-
pant, e.g., by logging and evaluating pre-
vious events systematically, or by partially
replacing the human participant with auto-
mated search strategies.
3. Metastrategies: Attacks in this category are com-
pliant with the NVE and do not involve software
modifications. They exploit principal vulnerabili-
ties present in the NVE, e.g., collusive collaboration
of human participants, or mobbing of fellow partici-
pants.
Note that system security attacks are targeted against the
server systems, while all other attack groups identified in
this section describe exploits which involve the client side
only.
System security attacks are exploits that do not involve
specific properties of NVES and therefore they are not in
the scope of this paper. On the other extreme, Metastrate-
gies cannot be coped with by technical means. Conse-
quently, the focus of this paper is on Semantic Subversion
Attacks; these attacks are further subdivided into the cat-
egories Semantic Integrity Violation and Client Amplifi-
cation. The latter cannot be handled in a rigorous way,
but are amenable to statistical detection and countermea-
sures similar to intrusion detection systems. Thus, we
have identified Semantic Integrity Violation as the main
NVE-specific class of attacks which needs to be treated
at the protocol level. The protocols presented in this pa-
per consider both rule corruption and causality alteration
attacks. To do so, the protocols enforce the following two
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conditions on the client behavior:
• Rule Compliance: Each client is only allowed to
act in accordance with the rules of the NVE. This
prevents rule corruption.
• Action Commitments: Critical actions initiated by
the client must be executed in an unrevocable and
undeniable manner. Consequently, clients are not
allowed to choose an alternative history of actions
once they obtain more information in the future. This
condition prevents causality alteration.
3 Unsecured Client Cycle
In this section, we review the state update mechanism
that is commonly implemented in NVES that maintain
a central abstract state. We write ASTATE to denote the
centrally maintained and abstracted state. The portion
of ASTATE which is accessible to Clienti is denoted by
ASTATE[Clienti] (this portion depends on the spatial po-
sition of Clienti in the simulated world). Clients have to
map these abstracted states to concrete ones. Given an
abstract state s, we use γ(s) to denote the set of possi-
ble concretizations. Furthermore, if S is a concrete state,
then α(S) is the unique abstract state which corresponds
to S. The pair α()/γ() can be naturally viewed as a Galois
connection between the set of abstract and concrete states
[10], i.e., S ∈ γ(α(S)) and s = α(X) for any X ∈ γ(s).
When connecting to the NVE, Clienti receives a con-
crete state S ∈ γ(ASTATE[Clienti]) to initialize its local
state STATE[Clienti]. From this point on, Clienti main-
tains and updates STATE[Clienti] locally.
If Clienti wishes to change its state, it has to inform
the StateServer in order to update the central NVE-state
ASTATE. For this purpose, Clienti computes a state up-
date in the form of a compact description ∆ of the dif-
ference between the current state STATE[Clienti]t and the
intended next state; we call ∆ a diff. Given a state S and a
diff ∆ between S and S′, we denote the application of ∆
to S by S′ = S ⊞∆. Note that ∆ will typically be small
compared to the state descriptions S if the NVE performs
a fine-grained simulation of the virtual world.
In the following, we will apply α() and γ() not only
to states, but also to diffs. In particular, we use α(∆) to
denote the abstraction of a diff. If S′ = S ⊞ ∆ holds,
then we require that α(S′) = α(S) ⊞ α(∆) is also true.
Furthermore, we use γ(S, δ) to denote the concretization
of an abstract diff δ relative to a concrete state S. More
precisely, if S′ = S ⊞ ∆, then ∆ ∈ γ(S, α(∆)) and for
all ∆′ ∈ γ(S, α(∆)), we get α(S ⊞∆′) = α(S′).
One client cycle consists of the following steps: The
client sends an abstraction of ∆, denoted by δ = α(∆),
to StateServer, which evaluates the semantics of the up-
date. Now, two cases can happen:
• If δ is allowed with respect to the semantics
of the NVE, then StateServer responds with a
δ′ that contains all changes intended by Clienti
together with state updates performed by other
clients present in the NVE. Upon receipt of
δ′, Clienti computes a concretization ∆′ ∈
γ(STATE[Clienti], δ′) and updates its own state by
computing STATE[Clienti]t+1 = STATE[Clienti]t ⊞
∆′.
• If δ is not consistent with the semantics of the NVE,
the server refuses to apply the update. This can hap-
pen if Clienti tries to do something impossible, such
as opening a locked door. Moreover, inconsistencies
can be caused by synchronization and communica-
tion errors (e.g., packet loss of the underlying net-
work). In this case, the StateServer responds with
a state update δ′ which only contains the states up-
dates of other clients.
If the clients behave according to the NVE specifica-
tion, this protocol suffices to consistently maintain both
the state of the clients and the server. However, if mali-
cious clients participate in the simulation, this protocol is
susceptible to semantic integrity violation as described in
Section 1: StateServer is only able to check whether the
abstract state updates δ = α(∆) are consistent with its
abstract state. A malicious Client can make an inconsis-
tent state change ∆ whose abstraction δ is consistent with
the NVE rules.
In the next section, we show how to amend the basic
state update protocol described above with cryptographic
mechanisms in order to prevent semantic integrity viola-
tion attacks.
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4 A Secure Semantic Integrity Pro-
tocol
In this section, we describe a protocol to enforce semantic
integrity, which satisfies all requirements established in
Section 1. Our approach is based on an audit procedure,
which is performed by a dedicated server, namely the
AuditServer. During each client cycle, the client sends a
piece of evidence (containing a MAC of the applied con-
crete state update) as action commitment to AuditServer.
Note that our security model assumes that AuditServer is
fully trusted, which implies that a client is unable to al-
ter past action commitments. When auditing is required,
AuditServer asks a Client for a sequence of concrete
state updates for a specific time frame. Based on this in-
formation, AuditServer simulates the requested segment
of the Client computation and checks its compliance to
the NVE rules. In addition, AuditServer checks whether
the received concrete state updates match the action com-
mitments received in the past. If both checks pass, the
client is considered honest.
Audits are initiated according to a strategy determined
by the server, which is unpredictable for the client. For ex-
ample AuditServer might choose clients for auditing in a
completely random fashion or audit “on demand” when-
ever statistical evidence suggests cheating. However, it is
important for the security of the NVE that the clients can-
not predict the time when AuditServer invokes the (next)
audit protocol.
The auditing process is organized in terms of audit cy-
cles, where each audit cycle consists of exactly l client cy-
cles. At each lth client cycle, a new audit cycle is started.
At the beginning of each audit cycle, the client sends a
MAC of the concrete full state as action commitment to
AuditServer. As this MAC may be costly to compute be-
cause of the large state description, this message has to
arrive only within the current audit cycle (i.e., within the
next l client cycles). In addition, as noted above, the client
sends an action commitment of the applied concrete diff
during each client cycle; as the diff is usually small, we
require that this message arrives at AuditServer during
the same client cycle.
In this paper, we assume for simplicity that l is a
system-wide announced and agreed on parameter. How-
ever, it is possible to customize l for each client while
the simulation is running. The parameter l essentially de-
termines how far back into the past auditing is possible.
Consequently, the probability of successful cheating de-
creases with both the parameter l and the frequency of the
audit procedure. In particular, we shall see that there is a
trade-off between the probability for successful cheating
and the required additional network bandwidth.
While StateServer only keeps the current abstracted
central state, the clients do not only maintain their current
concrete state but also retain a history of previous states
in a local buffer, containing up to 3 full states and 3l diffs.
During the audit process, AuditServer requires Client to
prove that its actions during the last two completely fin-
ished audit cycles and the current audit cycle are compli-
ant to the rules of the NVE. To do so, the Client has to
retain a copy of the complete state at the beginning of each
new audit cycle together with diffs between the states of
intermediate client cycles. All buffer content older than
three audit cycles on the client side can be deleted safely.
More precisely, the buffer describes a sliding window
which contains the state history of the last 2l + 1 to 3l
client cycles, i.e., the last two full audit cycles and the
current one. The sliding window which is maintained at
client cycle t0 ≥ 2l contains the states Sta , Sta+l , St0 as
well as all the intermediate diffs ∆′ta+1, . . . ,∆
′
t0
where
ta =
⌊
t0
l
− 2
⌋
l. (1)
Thus ta denotes the expiration time for client side audit
information. In addition to the history of states, the client
stores all messages received from the server within the
time interval determined by the sliding window.
Figures 2a, b, and c show the gradual change of the
buffer of one specific client. These figures illustrate the
buffer contents at client cycles 7l+1, 7l+2, and 7l+3 =
8l, respectively. The symbol • represents a fully saved
state, whereas N represents a concrete diff, both saved at
the client. On the other hand, ◦ and △ represent action
commitments of full states and diffs which are available
at the AuditServer.
As seen in Figure 2, at most three fully saved states are
retained at any given time; the scope of an audit process
covers at most three audit cycles (see Figure 2b). Once
a new audit cycle is completed, the information about an
earlier audit cycle can be discarded (see Figure 2c).
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Figure 2: The ”sliding window”.
Crucial to the correctness of the audit process is the
enforcement of the timing conditions for the action com-
mitments. The action commitment of a diff must arrive
within the current client cycle, whereas action commit-
ments of full states must be available only when the cur-
rent audit cycle is completed. In Figure 2 the action com-
mitments (represented by △) for diffs are available at the
AuditServer immediately. In contrast, the action com-
mitment ◦ for the full state 7l becomes available when the
system enters state 8l.
Note that the late availability of the full state action
commitment messages requires the audit process to audit
at least two full audit cycles, as otherwise the MAC (and
thus also the semantic integrity) of the intermediate state
Sta+l , which serves as possible future audit starting point,
cannot be verified. In contrast, the protocols can easily be
adapted in such a way that more audit cycles are verified
during each invocation of the audit protocol. However,
for the sake of brevity, we present the protocols for the
simplest case of auditing at most three audit cycles.
If Client is audited, it has to send the contents of the
current sliding window (i.e., the state information and cor-
responding state server messages) to AuditServer. First,
AuditServer checks whether the received state informa-
tion machetes the action commitments received previ-
ously. Second, AuditServer checks whether the client
computation is compliant to the rules of the NVE by sim-
ulating the client. The audit results in a positive verdict if
and only if both checks succeed.
Protocol Description. Secure integrity enforcement is
performed by three protocols Initialize, StatusUpdate and
Audit. The protocol Initialize is performed whenever
a client wants to join the NVE, whereas StatusUpdate
is executed at each client cycle (i.e., whenever a client
wishes to change its state). Finally, Audit implements the
auditing mechanism. We assume that a client leaving the
NVE performs an ordinary status update, where the diff
encodes the intention to leave the NVE.
For the sake of simplicity, we present the protocol for
a single client Client that interacts with StateServer and
AuditServer. For multiple clients, the protocol is pro-
cessed asynchronously in parallel. Sending a message
unreliably will be denoted by →֒. Sending a message re-
liably that must arrive before the next t-th client cycle is
initiated, will be denoted by  t. Unreliable messages
may be dropped or delivered with delay. However, we
assume that no packet corruption occurs.
In the protocols we use a Message Authentication Code
(MAC) as cryptographic primitive. The tagging algo-
rithm, which takes a message m and a key k and pro-
duces a MAC t, is denoted by t = MAC(k,m), whereas
the verification algorithm is written as Verify(k,m, t) =
{TRUE, FALSE}. We write M = AuthMsg(m,Client, k)
as an abbreviation for m ‖MAC(k,m ‖Client), where ‖
denotes string concatenation. Furthermore, we will de-
note with M (1) andM (2) the two parts of the messageM ,
i.e., M (1) = m and M (2) = MAC(k,m ‖Client). For
the sake of simplicity we will abbreviate STATE[Client]
t
with St.
The protocols use two different MAC keys:
kStateServer is mutually agreed between the state
server and the audit server and is used to authenticate
status updates sent from StateServer to Client. The
MAC enables AuditServer to check whether a cheating
Client has passed modified status update messages to
the AuditServer. The key kClient is agreed between
Client and AuditServer and is used to authenticate
action commitments sent to AuditServer during each
client cycle.
In the following, we describe each protocol in detail:
Initialize: This protocol initializes the state of a Client
wishing to join the NVE (see Figure 3).
Upon opening a connection to StateServer, the client
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1. Client and AuditServer exchange a MAC session key kClient
2. Client initializes t := 0 and sends an initialization request to StateServer.
3. StateServer chooses S ∈ γ(ASTATE[Client])
4. StateServer →֒ Client : M0 := AuthMsg(kStateServer, S ‖n0,Client)
5. Client sets S0 := S
6. Client  l AuditServer : Q0 := MAC(kClient , S0)
Figure 3: Protocol Initialize
1. Client computes a desired status change ∆t+1 and its abstraction δt+1 = α(∆t+1)
2. Client →֒ StateServer : δt+1
3. Upon receiving δt+1, StateServer computes a new δ′t+1 and updates its central state ASTATE accordingly
4. StateServer →֒ Client : Mt+1 := AuthMsg(kStateServer, δ′t+1 ‖nt + 1,Client)
5. Client chooses ∆′t+1 ∈ γ(St, δ′t+1) and computes St+1 = St ⊞∆′t+1
6. Client stores ∆′t+1
7. Client  1 AuditServer : Dt+1 := MAC(kClient , ∆
′
t+1)
8. Client increments t
9. if tmod l = 0
(a) Client deletes all ∆′
t−i with 2l ≤ i < 3l as well as the full state St−3l (if t ≥ 3l).
(b) Client stores St and starts to compute Qt := MAC(kClient , St).
(c) After computation of Qt, Client  l AuditServer : Qt.
Figure 4: Protocol StatusUpdate
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1. AuditServer →֒ Client : audit‖ t0
2. Client computes ta =
⌊
t0
l
− 2
⌋
l
3. Client →֒ AuditServer : Sta ‖∆′ta+1 ‖ . . . ‖∆′t0 ‖Mta+1 ‖ . . . ‖Mt0
4. AuditServer computes Sˆi+1 = Sˆi ⊞∆′i+1 for i = ta, . . . , t0 − 1 where Sˆta = Sta
5. For all i = ta + 1, . . . , t0, AuditServer checks whether ∆′i is chosen from γ(Sˆi, δ′i) compliant to the rules of the
NVE, where δ′
i
is taken from the message Mi
6. For all i = ta + 1, . . . , t0, AuditServer checks whether
(a) Verify(kStateServer,M
(1)
i
‖Client,M (2)
i
) = TRUE and
(b) Verify(kClient ,∆′i, Di) = TRUE
7. AuditServer checks whether Verify(kClient , Sta , Qta) = TRUE and Verify(kClient , Sˆta+l, Qta+l) = TRUE.
If ta = 0, Client →֒ AuditServer : M (2)0 and AuditServer checks Verify(kStateServer, S0,M
(2)
0 ‖Client) =
TRUE.
8. AuditServer accepts the computations of Client if and only if all tests in steps 5 to 7 passed.
Figure 5: Protocol Audit
receives the relevant status information together with a
randomly generated nounce n0 and a MAC of the mes-
sage. At this point the state server transmits a concrete
state S ∈ γ(ASTATE[Client]) to the client. The client ini-
tializes its local state S0 with S. Note that, this is the
only point, besides the audit procedure, where a concrete
state is transmitted. Finally, the client sends as evidence
a MAC of its state S0 reliably to the audit server; as the
MAC of the concrete state may be costly to compute, we
only require that this sending process is completed before
the lth client cycle is initiated.
StatusUpdate: After initialization, the client uses this
protocol to update its local state in each client cycle to
reflect actions of the client itself, of other clients, and the
state server. Formally, the protocol is shown in Figure 4.
Suppose the client is in state St and wants to change
its state according to the diff ∆t+1. To initiate the up-
date protocol, the client sends an abstracted diff δt+1 =
α(∆t+1) to StateServer. The server checks whether
this request is valid and consistent with the current cen-
tral NVE state ASTATE and computes a new update de-
scription δ′t+1. This update description might differ from
δt+1 since it has to reflect changes of other clients and the
server itself; however, if δt+1 is legitimate with respect
to the NVE semantics, δ′
t+1 contains the state changes of
δt+1. If δt+1 violates the semantic integrity, δ′t+1 only
contains the state updates of the other clients but not δt+1
(or at most those actions in δt+1 that are consistent). The
StateServer updates its centrally managed state ASTATE
according to δ′t+1 and sends δ′t+1 back to the client, to-
gether with a MAC and an incremented nounce (steps 1-4
of the protocol).
The client now computes a concrete state update
∆′t+1 ∈ γ(St, δ
′
t+1) and applies it to St to enter the next
state St+1 = St ⊞∆′t+1. Finally the client sends a MAC
of the concrete diff ∆′t+1 as action commitment reliably
to the AuditServer before the next client cycle is started
(this message is denoted by Di). Additionally, at the be-
ginning of each audit cycle, the client sends a MAC of its
full state to AuditServer; this message can be sent unre-
liably and must arrive within the current audit cycle (i.e.,
within the next l client cycles); this message is denoted by
Qi (steps 5-8 in the protocol).
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For audit purposes, the client saves all information as
evidence that is necessary for the audit server to simu-
late its computations. More precisely, at the beginning of
each audit cycle, the client saves its full state; in inter-
mediate client cycles, the client only retains diffs to the
previous state. In addition, the client saves all messages
Mi received from the state server. Finally, all outdated
audit information (i.e., the fully saved state, all diffs and
messages belonging to the third-last audit cycle) can be
removed (step 9 in the protocol).
Audit: During the audit protocol, AuditServer vali-
dates the computations of one Client. In particular,
AuditServer checks whether the client can present con-
crete state updates that match the action commitments re-
ceived so far and are consistent with the NVE rules; see
Figure 5.
The auditing protocol is initiated by an audit message
sent to the Client during client cycle t0. An audit can be
initiated at any client cycle t0 ≥ 2l. The client first com-
putes the starting point ta of the audit according to equa-
tion (1). The client then sends the concrete state Sta as
well as all diffs ∆′
i
and messages Mi for ta + 1 ≤ i ≤ t0
to the AuditServer (steps 1-3 of the protocol). Finally, the
audit server checks, using the action commitment mes-
sages Di and Qi submitted by the client before, whether
the client adhered to the NVE semantics. In particular,
the audit server checks
• whether all ∆′
i
are suitable concretizations of δ′
i
sent
by the state server in message Mi (step 5),
• whether all state server messages Mi (ta + 1 ≤ i ≤
t0) are unmodified (step 6a) and
• whether all action commitment messages submitted
by the client beforehand are valid, in particular the
AuditServer checks
– the MACs on the messagesDi, ta+1 ≤ i ≤ t0,
(step 6b) and
– the MACs of the full states Sta and Sta+l, con-
tained in the messages Qta and Qta+l (step 7).
Note that these messages are already available
to the audit server if the timing conditions of
the StatusUpdate protocol are enforced.
• If the first audit cycle is to be audited (ta =
0), then Client is required to present M (2)0 =
MAC(kStateServer, S0‖Client) to AuditServer
additionally to prove that the initial state S0 has been
authorized by the StateServer (step 7).
If all checks pass, the client is considered honest (step 8).
Security. Our protocols enforce rule compliance be-
cause in each client cycle the client is committing to its
concrete diff ∆′. In addition, the client “commits” to its
concrete state St in each l-th client cycle. After this in-
formation arrived at AuditServer, the client cannot cheat
about its past states (in theory it is possible for a malicious
client to send a MAC of an incorrect state in message
Qt, but this would be noticed during the audit process).
The audit server is thus able to fully simulate and vali-
date the computations of the client. The unforgeability
of the MAC implies that the client cannot alter its cho-
sen state transitions a posteriori. Furthermore, if the tim-
ing conditions are enforced (i.e., the network delivers all
 -messages reliably in time) the protocols do not allow
causality alteration, as the MAC must arrive at the audit
server within the current client cycle.
Computational Overhead. The protocol can be imple-
mented in a very resource efficient manner: The Sta-
tusUpdate protocol requires only a few MAC computa-
tions over relatively small amounts of data. The MAC
computation over the complete state of a client can be pro-
cessed in background during the l client cycles of an audit
cycle. Moreover, only the MACs are additionally trans-
mitted over the network.
In contrast, the Audit protocol is much more data in-
tensive and involves a complete re-simulation of the client
computations. However, the execution of the Audit proto-
col is not time critical and can be delegated to a specific
server, namely the AuditServer. Therefore, it does not
cause resource overhead at the StateServer. The degree
of confidence in the computations of the clients can be
enhanced by increasing the number of audit servers and
thereby increasing the number of Audit protocol execu-
tions.
In most application scenarios, the limiting resource for
increasing the probability that a client cycle is audited
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is the bandwidth B which is available for auditing. A
closer analysis shows that this probability is proportional
to B|∆|+|M| , where |∆| is the maximum size of concrete
diffs and |M | is the maximum size of authorized state
server messages. In general, the memory requirements
of the client are not a limitation since the client can buffer
the history on a hard disk.
To integrate our protocol into an NVE system, one has
to implement the protocol logic, add the computation of
the MACs at the state server and the client, and imple-
ment the audit server. It should be possible to implement
the audit server by mainly reusing client code since the
audit server is simulating the client computations. The
biggest problem in implementing the protocol will likely
be the creation of copies of the complete client state in a
timely manner, as required at the beginning of each audit
cycle. However, all remaining parts of the protocol can be
implemented in a straight forward manner.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have argued that networked virtual en-
vironments are an emerging network technology which
has not been subject to rigorous security investigations.
We have identified semantic integrity as a core security
problem in NVES. Untrusted and malicious clients may
utilize the fact that the central NVE server can—due to
the limited computing power and the deficits of the net-
work connection—only maintain an abstracted version of
the NVE state. To overcome this problem, we have intro-
duced a new audit trail mechanism which is able to verify
the compliance of the client computation. Although we
allow autonomous clients, our protocols assure that regu-
larly cheating clients will be identified with a high proba-
bility. The audit mechanism proposed in this paper can be
integrated seamlessly into current NVE architectures and
inflicts little engineering and resource overhead. We are
currently working on formal security proofs for our proto-
cols. The protocols presented here will be integrated into
SYNEIGHT [14], a new middleware for NVES which is
developed by our group. A detailed description of the
SYNEIGHT middleware will be given in future work.
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